The Process Through Which Individuals And Groups Reach Consensus On A Collective Agreement

In (Gilbert 1989) and in subsequent articles and chapters, including Gilbert (2006, Chapter 7), which advocates for collective action based on a particular type of interpersonal engagement, what Gilbert calls a “common commitment.” A common commitment in Gilbert`s sense is not a matter of a number of personal obligations independently established by each participant, such as when each person makes a personal decision to do something. Rather, it is a unique obligation to create in which each participant contributes. So let`s say one of them says, “Are we going for a walk?” and the other one says, “Yes, let`s go.” Gilbert proposes that, as a result of this exchange, the parties have committed themselves together to walk around and have committed to pretend that they are part of a single person walking around. Common commitments may be less explicit and created by processes that lengthen over time. One of the merits of a joint declaration of commitment to collective action is, according to Gilbert, that it explains the fact that those who walk together, for example, understand that each of them is able to demand corrective action from the other if he or she acts in a way that has a negative impact on the completion of their walk. In (Gilbert 2006a), she discusses the relevance of the common commitment to collective action in the sense of rational choice theory. On the other hand, a well-informed person requires a specialization of members in their work of disseminating information: some become very active, while others – the majority – stop communicating. In addition, this phenomenon is becoming more and more pronounced with the growth of the Access to Information report. In other words, the more information decision makers have, the more hierarchical the optimal communication network with more specialized members is. Moreover, even unexpectedly, we find that high suggestive values (compliance values) correspond to well-informed agents, but not to a consensus with which it is weakly correlated. We will discuss these results in detail in the “Results” section. In Searle (1990), Searle argues that the heart of collective action is the presence of each participant with an intention of “us” in the head. Searle does not report on the intentions of ourselves or, as he puts it, “collective intentionality,” but insists that they are different from the “intentions I” that animate the actions of people who act alone.

Traditionally, game theory has been used to study zero-sum games, but has been extended to many types of games. Cooperative and non-cooperative games are relevant to the study of spontaneous consensus. Because a consensus must be reached without the presence of an external institution, so that it can be considered spontaneous and uncooperative games, and that the balance of snacking was the dominant paradigm for studying its formation. and similarly, the group`s performance is linked to the consensus, “alpha” “cons”), the relationship with which the initial disagreement was reduced: Question: What topics can be covered by collective bargaining? Daniel Kahneman, Nobel laureate: “Whatever it usually produces, an organization is a factory that makes judgments and decisions.”